Cash in the Bank

From time to time, we have noted that the state is sitting on a lot of cash. While some of that cash is in reserves associated with the General Fund, much is in "special funds" that are earmarked for various purposes (such as roads, transit, etc.). Here is what the Legislative Analyst's Office (LAO) has to say about state cash:

Executive Summary

California’s Cash Balance Reached Astonishing $100 Billion. The state’s cash balance—the internal borrowable resources the State Controller uses to ensure the state can pay its bills on time—is very strong. It now sits around $90 billion, only modestly below the peak of over $100 billion held in May 2024. As shown below, the state’s cash balance has been rising for some years, but it rose most dramatically after the pandemic in 2020. This is all the more remarkable given the situation less than two decades ago: during the Great Recession, California faced a cash crisis, with cash nearing administrative minimums while a frozen credit market nearly precluded emergency borrowing.

This Balance Results From Unplanned Cash in Special Funds, Not Necessarily an Inherent Sign of Fiscal Strength. The state’s cash balance has remained strong despite weakness in the state budget—double digit deficits in 2023‑24, and persistent structural shortfalls since. This is because the state’s cash balance and its General Fund budget condition can be related but are not directly linked. Rather, most of the balance increase reflects unplanned cash that built up in special funds: money that has been appropriated but not yet disbursed, now representing about half of all special fund balances. These balances accumulated for several reinforcing reasons—increased state and federal infrastructure funding occurred simultaneously with supply chain constraints and slowing project time lines, the pandemic‑era General Fund revenue surge spilled into special funds through transfers and loans, and federal funds surged such that departments rationally drew down those time‑limited funds before their own state fund balances. Beyond unplanned cash, reserves also built up during the surplus years—which does reflect genuine fiscal strength—and new funds and expanded services have added modestly to balances since 2020.

Having This Much Cash Has Been Useful to the State… A large cash balance confers genuine benefits. The state’s ability to manage daily cash flow without external borrowing saves interest costs and reduces bond market dependence. California has not needed to borrow for cash flow purposes in more than a decade and has not been at risk of a cash crisis, despite a sharp revenue decline in 2022‑23 and significant budget deficits since. Beyond routine cash flow management, the state has also used its cash balance to advance specific policy goals and has used indirect borrowing from cash resources to balance the General Fund budget. This latter borrowing occurred via two “maneuvers”—which essentially allow the state to make cash payments now while deferring their recognition in the budget to future years, effectively using the cash balance for an interest‑free loan.

…But Over Reliance on Cash Borrowing Carries Real Risks. Using the state’s cash balance in these ways is not without trade‑offs and risks. These maneuvers create real future obligations that are invisible in standard budget documents. Further, cash borrowing carries two structural risks that make it a poor substitute for more conventional budget solutions. First, the policymakers and taxpayers who benefit from deferring costs today will not always be the same ones who must repay them, creating an incentive to borrow and a disincentive to repay. And, second, repayment must be proactive: if repeatedly deferred, the obligation grows and the tool eventually disappears. As such, in this report, we recommend the Legislature treat cash borrowing as an option of last resort, maintain its planned repayment schedules, and avoid any further delays.

Maintaining Cash Vigilance Is Critical. The state’s cash balance has already declined somewhat from its May 2024 high, and we expect it to continue declining. In particular, this will occur as the backlog of infrastructure funds eventually works through the system, as pandemic‑era federal programs unwind, and if the state continues to use reserves to address deficits. This decline should be viewed as normal and expected—it reflects the unwinding of the dynamics described in this report, not fiscal deterioration. Nonetheless, we recommend the Legislature avoid actions that accelerate that decline unnecessarily. This would include further cash borrowing to balance the budget, or further delays in repaying existing maneuvers. The state has come a long way from the cash crisis of the Great Recession. We recommend the Legislature preserve that fiscal resilience, particularly given heightened economic and financial market uncertainty.

Full report at https://lao.ca.gov/Publications/Report/5198.